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Abstract
The power of players in a collective decision process is a central issue in game theory. For
this reason, the concept of inuence of players on a simple game has been introduced. More
generally, the inuence of variables on Boolean functions has been dened and studied. We
extend this concept to pseudo-Boolean functions, thus making it possible to appraise the degree
of inuence of any coalition of players in cooperative games. In the case of monotone games,
we also point out the links with the concept of interaction among players. Although they do not
have the same meaning at all, both inuence and interaction functions coincide on singletons
with the so-called Banzhaf power index. We also dene the inuence of variables on continuous
extensions of pseudo-Boolean functions. In particular, the Lovasz extension, also called discrete
Choquet integral, is used in multicriteria decision making problems as an aggregation operator.
In such problems, the degree of inuence of decision criteria on the aggregation process can
then be quite relevant information. We give the explicit form of this inuence for the Choquet
integral and its classical particular cases. ? 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Pseudo-Boolean functions; Game theory; Power and interaction indices; Multicriteria
decision making
1. Introduction
Let f be a Boolean function on n variables, and let S be a given subset of variables.
The inuence of S over f, denoted If(S), is dened as follows [3,11]. Assign values
to the variables not in S at random, that is, variables are set independently of each
other and the probability of a zero assignment is one half. This partial assignment may
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already suce to set the value of f. The probability that f remains undetermined is
dened as the inuence of S over f.
The motivation of this concept stems from the problem of searching for robust voting
schemes in game theory. As an illustration, consider an n-person simple game G which
proceeds according to the outcome of coin ips [2]. Every player ips an unbiased coin
and announces the outcome: 0 or 1. The collective decision of G is then given by a
consensus function f:f0; 1gn!f0; 1g, which characterizes the procedure of the game.
We assume that the probability for G to end with one is equal to one half.
The simplest procedure is the dictatorial voting scheme, in which only one player
ips his coin for all. However, such a procedure could be dangerous if not all players
play the game fairly and that some of them announce outcomes according to their
interest in the game and not by ipping their coin. Given a coalition of players S, the
inuence of S on the game G is then dened as the probability that the players of S
may control the outcome of G when the rest of the players play fairly.
The dictatorial voting scheme is the most sensitive to the presence of an unfair
player. Indeed, we clearly have
f(x1; : : : ; xn) = xk ) If(k) = 1 and If(i) = 0 8i 6= k:
It is natural to search for voting schemes which are more robust, so that the inuence
of single players is as small as possible. For the majority voting, the inuence of any
player is O(1=
p
n). More precisely, one can easily show that (see Section 5)
f(x1; : : : ; x2k−1) = x(k) ) If(i) = 122k−2

2k − 2
k − 1

8i;
where x(k) is the median of the numbers x1; : : : ; x2k−1. Rather surprisingly, there are
voting schemes signicantly more robust than majority voting. Ben-Or and Linial [2]
constructed a voting scheme that reduces the inuence of each player to O(log n=n),
which is asymptotically optimal.
In this paper we generalize the concept of inuence to pseudo-Boolean functions
(PBF), i.e., real-valued functions on Boolean variables. Back to the collective coin
ipping game, we might assume that the global outcome is a real number, for example
the sum of the individual outcomes, weighted by the importance of each player :
f(x1; : : : ; xn) =
nX
i=1
!ixi with
nX
i=1
!i = 1 and !i>0 8i: (1)
The inuence over f of any coalition S of players, denoted If(S), is then dened as
the average amplitude of the range of f that S may control when the rest of the players
play fairly. For the weighted mean (1), one can show that this inuence is given by
the sum of the individual weights
If(S) =
X
i2S
!i:
More generally, let G : =(N; v) be a cooperative game, where N : =f1; : : : ; ng is the
set of players and v is the characteristic function of G, that is a set function v : 2N !R
J.-L. Marichal / Discrete Applied Mathematics 107 (2000) 139{164 141
such that v(;) = 0. Such a set function assigns to each coalition S of players a real
number v(S) representing the worth of S. Through the usual identication of coalitions
S N with elements of f0; 1gn, one can regard the characteristic function v as a PBF,
and the above denition of inuence can be adapted to v (see Section 2 for a complete
denition).
When v is monotone and such that v(N )= 1, this inuence identies with the arith-
metic mean of the marginal contribution of S alone in all outer coalitions, that is,
Iv(S) =
1
2n−jSj
X
T NnS
[v(T [ S)− v(T )]; S N:
Thus, we observe that the inuence function coincides on singletons with the Banzhaf
power index [1,5].
We also apply the concept of inuence to multicriteria decision-making. In this
context, N represents a set of decision criteria and v is a non-additive measure on
N , that is, a monotone set function v : 2N !R such that v(;) = 0 and v(N ) = 1. For
any combination S of criteria, v(S) is interpreted as the degree of importance of S, or
its power to make the decision alone (without the remaining criteria). Now, from the
satisfaction prole x = (x1; : : : ; xn) 2 [0; 1]n of a given alternative, one can compute a
global evaluation Mv(x) by means of an aggregation operator Mv : [0; 1]n!R, which
takes into account the importance of the criteria. A suitable aggregation operator, whose
use has been suggested by many authors [7], is the discrete Choquet integral, which
is actually a continuous extension on the cube [0; 1]n of the PBF that represents v.
Since the global evaluation depends on the importance of criteria, it would be in-
teresting to appraise the degree of inuence of any combination of criteria over the
Choquet integral. In this paper we propose a denition of inuence function for any
continuous extension of a PBF. In the case of Choquet integral, this inuence function
coincides on singletons with the Shapley power index [18].
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the concept of
inuence function on a PBF. We also give the explicit form of this function in terms of
the PBF and its Mobius transform. In Section 3 we propose an analogous denition for
continuous extensions. Two particular cases are investigated : the multilinear extension,
whose inuence coincides with that of the associated PBF, and the Lovasz extension,
which is nothing but the Choquet integral. In Section 4 we interpret the inuence
function in cooperative games and point out its connections with the interaction among
players, a concept introduced axiomatically by Grabisch and Roubens [9]. In Section 5
we discuss the problem of robustness of voting schemes. On this issue, the concept of
entropy of a non-additive measure proves to be helpful in determining robust collective
decision rules. In Section 6 we study the inuence function on the discrete Choquet
integral, which is particularly relevant in multicriteria decision making. Finally, in
Section 7 we propose an alternative denition of inuence on PBFs from a specic
probability distribution.
In order to avoid a heavy notation, cardinality of subsets S; T; : : : will be denoted
whenever possible by the corresponding lower case letters s; t; : : :, otherwise by the
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standard notation jSj; jT j; : : : : Moreover, we will often omit braces for singletons, e.g.
writing a(i), Nni instead of a(fig), Nnfig. Also, for pairs, we will often write ij
instead of fi; jg, as for example a(ij).
For any subset S N , eS will denote the characteristic vector of S in f0; 1gn, i.e.,
the vector of f0; 1gn whose ith component is one if and only if i 2 S.
The discrete cube f0; 1gn can be assimilated with f0; 1gN , that is, the set of mappings
x :N!f0; 1g. For any x; y 2 f0; 1gN we then dene xSy−S 2 f0; 1gN as
xSy−S : =
X
i2S
xiei +
X
i2NnS
yiei:
We proceed analogously with the entire cube [0; 1]n.
Finally, we introduce the notation ~x : =(x; : : : ; x) 2 [0; 1]N for any x 2 [0; 1].
2. The inuence of variables on PBFs
Let f : f0; 1gn!f0; 1g be a Boolean function, and let S N . Dene the inuence
of S over f, denoted by If(S), as the probability that assigning values to the variables
not in S at random, the value of f is undetermined, see [3,11]. Formally, considering
f0; 1gN as a probability space with uniform distribution, we have
If(S) :=Pr(y 2 f0; 1gNnS jf(xSy−S) is not constant w:r:t: x 2 f0; 1gS):
The following immediate result, which seems to be previously unknown in the lit-
erature, gives the explicit form of If(S) in terms of f.
Proposition 2.1. For any function f : f0; 1gn!f0; 1g; we have
If(S) =
1
2n−s
X
T NnS

max
K  S
f(eT[K)− min
K  S
f(eT[K)

; S N:
Proof. We simply have
If(S) = Pr

y 2 f0; 1gNnS
 maxx2f0;1gS f(xSy−S)− minx2f0;1gS f(xSy−S) = 1

=
1
2n−s
X
y2f0;1gNnS

max
x2f0;1gS
f(xSy−S)− min
x2f0;1gS
f(xSy−S)

;
which is sucient.
One also denes the inuence of S towards zero as follows [2,11]. Let
p : =Pr(f = 0) = Pr(x 2 f0; 1gN jf(x) = 0)
and denote by p0 the probability that assigning values to the variables not in S at
random, it is possible to assign values to the variables in S so as to make f equal to
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zero. The dierence p0 − p is dened to be I 0f (S), the inuence of S towards zero.
The inuence towards one I 1f (S) is dened analogously.
Proposition 2.2. For any function f : f0; 1gn!f0; 1g; we have
I 0f (S) =
1
2n
X
T N
f(eT )− 12n−s
X
T NnS
min
K  S
f(eT[K); S N;
I 1f (S) =
1
2n−s
X
T NnS
max
K  S
f(eT[K)− 12n
X
T N
f(eT ); S N
and hence If = I 0f + I
1
f .
Proof. We have
I 0f (S) = Pr(y 2 f0; 1gNnS j 9 x 2 f0; 1gS : f(xSy−S) = 0)− Pr(f = 0)
= Pr

y 2 f0; 1gNnS
 minx2f0;1gS f(xSy−S) = 0

− Pr(f = 0)
= Pr(f = 1)− Pr

y 2 f0; 1gNnS
 minx2f0;1gS f(xSy−S) = 1

=
1
2n
X
T N
f(eT )− 12n−s
X
T NnS
min
K  S
f(eT[K);
which proves the rst equality. The second one can be established similarly.
The denition of If can be extended in a natural way to PBFs as follows. Let
f : f0; 1gn!R and S N . If f is constant everywhere then S has no inuence on
f. Otherwise, the inuence of S on f is dened as the expected value of the highest
relative variation of f when assigning values to the variables not in S at random.
Formally, denoting by Vf the gap between the extremal values of f, that is,
Vf : = max
x2f0;1gn
f(x)− min
x2f0;1gn
f(x);
we dene the inuence function If as follows.
Denition 2.1. Consider f0; 1gN as a probability space with uniform distribution. The
inuence of S N on f : f0; 1gn!R is dened by
If(S) :=
8><
>:
0 if f isconstant;
1
Vf
E

max
x2f0;1gS
f(xSy−S)− min
x2f0;1gS
f(xSy−S)

otherwise;
where the expectation is taken over all y 2 f0; 1gNnS .
One can readily see that Irf= If for all r 2 Rnf0g. Hence, replacing f by f=Vf, if
necessary, we may assume that Vf =1. The function f is then said to be normalized.
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Thus, for any normalized function f : f0; 1gn!R, we have
If(S) =
1
2n−s
X
y2f0;1gNnS

max
x2f0;1gS
f(xSy−S)− min
x2f0;1gS
f(xSy−S)

; S N;
or equivalently,
If(S) =
1
2n−s
X
T NnS

max
K  S
f(eT[K)− min
K  S
f(eT[K)

; S N; (2)
which shows that this denition of inuence is a generalization of that given for
Boolean functions.
Now, for any normalized function f : f0; 1gn!R, we also have
If(S) =
1
2n
X
y2f0;1gN

max
x2f0;1gS
f(xSy−S)− min
x2f0;1gS
f(xSy−S)

; S N;
showing that the expectation in Denition 2.1 can also be taken over all y 2 f0; 1gN .
Indeed, this latter expression is written
1
2n
X
T N

max
K  S
f(e(T\(NnS))[K)− min
K  S
f(e(T\(NnS))[K)

;
that is, partitioning T N into T1 S and T2N n S,
1
2n
X
T1 S
X
T2NnS

max
K  S
f(eT2[K)− minK  S f(eT2[K)

and we retrieve (2).
The case where f is monotone (i.e., non-decreasing in each variable) is particularly
interesting. For any monotone normalized function f : f0; 1gn!R, we have
If(S) = E[f( ~1Sy−S)− f( ~0Sy−S)]; S N:
In this case the inuence is linear with respect to f, as stated in the following result.
Proposition 2.3. For any monotone normalized function f : f0; 1gn!R; we have
If(S) =
1
2n−s
X
T NnS
[f(eT[S)− f(eT )]; S N:
Hammer and Rudeanu [10] showed that any PBF has a unique expression as a
multilinear polynomial in n variables :
f(x) =
X
T N
a(T )
Y
i2T
xi; x 2 f0; 1gn (3)
with a(T ) 2 R. In combinatorics, a viewed as a set function on N is called the Mobius
transform of f (see e.g. [17]), which is given by
a(S) =
X
T  S
(−1)s−tf(eT ); S N:
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The transformation is invertible and we have
f(eS) =
X
T  S
a(T ); S N: (4)
The inuence on any monotone normalized PBF can be expressed in terms of the
Mobius representation of f as follows.
Proposition 2.4. For any monotone normalized function f : f0; 1gn!R; we have
If(S) =
X
T N
T\S 6=;
a(T )
1
2jTnSj
; S N;
where a is the Mobius representation of f.
Proof. By using (4), we simply have
If(S) =
1
2n−s
X
T NnS
[f(eT[S)− f(eT )]
=
1
2n−s
X
T NnS
X
K  T[S
K\S 6=;
a(K)
=
1
2n−s
X
K N
K\S 6=;
a(K)
X
T :KnS T NnS
1
=
X
K N
K\S 6=;
a(K)
1
2jKnSj
as expected.
Example 2.1. Let f : f0; 1g3!R be given by
f(x1; x2; x3) = 13 (x1 + x2 + x2x3):
Then the values of the inuence function If are
If(;) = 0; If(1) = 13 ; If(12) = 56 ; If(123) = 1;
If(2) = 12 ; If(13) =
1
2 ;
If(3) = 16 ; If(23) =
2
3 :
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3. Case of continuous extensions
From any PBF f : f0; 1gn!R, we can dene a variety of continuous extensions
f : [0; 1]n!R which interpolate f at the 2n vertices of [0; 1]n, that is, f(eS)=f(eS) for
all S N . In this section we propose a denition for the inuence on such extensions.
First, dene V f as the gap between the extremal values of f, that is
V f : = sup
x2[0;1]n
f(x)− inf
x2[0;1]n
f(x):
We then propose the following denition.
Denition 3.1. Consider [0; 1]N as a probability space with uniform distribution. The
inuence of S N on f : [0; 1]n!R is dened by
I f(S) :=
8>><
>>:
0 if f is constant;
1
V f
E
"
sup
x2[0;1]S
f(xSy−S)− inf
x2[0;1]S
f(xSy−S)
#
otherwise;
where the expectation is taken over all y 2 [0; 1]NnS .
Here again, we can assume without loss of generality that f is normalized, that is
such that V f = 1. We then have trivially
I f(S) =
Z
[0;1]NnS
"
sup
x2[0;1]S
f(xSy−S)− inf
x2[0;1]S
f(xSy−S)
#
dy; S N:
Furthermore, the expectation (that is, the integral) can also be taken over all y 2 [0; 1]N .
If moreover f is monotone then
I f(S) =
Z
[0;1]NnS
[ f( ~1Sy−S)− f( ~0Sy−S)] dy; S N: (5)
We now investigate two particular cases of continuous extensions of PBFs : the
Owen multilinear extension and the Lovasz extension.
3.1. Multilinear extension of PBFs
The polynomial expression (3) was used in game theory in 1972 by Owen [16] as
the multilinear extension of a game.
Denition 3.2. The multilinear extension of f : f0; 1gn!R is the function f : [0; 1]n
!R dened by
f(x) :=
X
T N
f(eT )
Y
i2T
xi
Y
i 62T
(1− xi) =
X
T N
a(T )
Y
i2T
xi; x 2 [0; 1]n;
where a is the Mobius representation of f.
Proposition 3.1. For any monotone normalized PBF f : f0; 1gn!R; we have I f= If.
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Proof. First, we observe that f is monotone and normalized. Next, for any y 2
[0; 1]NnS , we have
f( ~1Sy−S) =
X
T N
T\S 6=;
a(T )
Y
i2TnS
yi +
X
T NnS
a(T )
Y
i2T
yi
f( ~0Sy−S) =
X
T NnS
a(T )
Y
i2T
yi:
Hence, by Eq. (5), we have
I f(S) =
Z
[0;1]NnS
2
4
X
T N
T\S 6=;
a(T )
Y
i2TnS
yi
3
5 dy
=
X
T N
T\S 6=;
a(T )
1
2jTnSj
:
We then conclude by Proposition 2.4.
3.2. Lovasz extension of PBFs
The Lovasz extension of a PBF is dened as follows (see [8] for more details).
Denition 3.3. The Lovasz extension of f : f0; 1gn!R is the function f^ : [0; 1]n!R
dened by
f^(x) :=
X
T N
a(T ) min
i2T
xi; x 2 [0; 1]n;
where a is the Mobius representation of f.
Using the identityZ
[0;1]n
min
i2S
xi dx =
1
s+ 1
; S N
(see [8]) and a proof analogous to that of Proposition 3.1, we can easily express the
inuence function associated to any monotone Lovasz extension f^ in terms of the
Mobius representation of f.
Proposition 3.2. For any monotone normalized function f : f0; 1gn!R; we have
If^(S) =
X
T N
T\S 6=;
a(T )
1
jT n Sj+ 1 ; S N; (6)
where a is the Mobius representation of f.
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From Eq. (6) we can derive the expression of If^ in terms of f. It is given in the
next proposition.
Proposition 3.3. For any monotone normalized function f : f0; 1gn!R; we have
If^(S) =
X
T NnS
(n− t − s)! t!
(n− s+ 1)! [f(eT[S)− f(eT )]; S N: (7)
Proof. By using (4), we simply have
X
T NnS
(n− t − s)!t!
(n− s+ 1)! [f(eT[S)− f(eT )]
=
X
T NnS
(n− t − s)!t!
(n− s+ 1)!
X
K  T[S
K\S 6=;
a(K)
=
X
K N
K\S 6=;
a(K)
X
T :KnS T NnS
(n− t − s)!t!
(n− s+ 1)!| {z }
()
:
Moreover, expression () is written
n−sX
t=jKnSj
 
n− s− jK n Sj
t − jK n Sj
!
(n− t − s)!t!
(n− s+ 1)!
=
n−s−jKnSjX
t=0
 
n− s− jK n Sj
t
!
(n− s− jK n Sj − t)!(t + jK n Sj)!
(n− s+ 1)!
=
1
(jK n Sj+ 1)

n−s+1
jKnSj+1
 n−s−jKnSjX
t=0

jKnSj+t
jKnSj

=

n−s+1
jKnSj+1

(jK n Sj+ 1)

n−s+1
jKnSj+1

=
1
jK n Sj+ 1 :
We then conclude by Proposition 3.2.
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One can also see that, for any monotone normalized function f : f0; 1gn!R, we
have
If^(S) =
Z 1
0
[ f( ~1S ~y−S)− f( ~0S ~y−S)] dy; S N: (8)
Indeed, from the expression of f in terms of the Mobius representation of f, we
immediately have
f( ~1S ~y−S)− f( ~0S ~y−S) =
X
T N
T\S 6=;
a(T )yjTnSj;
which is sucient.
As shown in the next example, Eq. (8) allows a rather quick computation of If^.
Example 3.1. For the PBF given in Example 2.1, one can see that If^ = If. The com-
putation can be done as follows. Suppose S = f1; 2g, then we have
f( ~1S ~y−S) = f(1; 1; y) =
2 + y
3
and f( ~0S ~y−S) = f(0; 0; y) = 0;
so that
If^(12) =
Z 1
0
[ f( ~1S ~y−S)− f( ~0S ~y−S)] dy =
Z 1
0
2 + y
3
dy = 56 :
4. Inuence of coalitions in games
Let G=(N; v) be a cooperative game, where N =f1; : : : ; ng is the set of players and
v is the characteristic function of G. When there is no fear of ambiguity, the game will
be simply denoted by v. In this section, we assume that v is monotone and normalized.
By identifying v with its corresponding PBF on f0; 1gN , we see by Proposition
2.3 that the inuence of any coalition S N on v is the expectation of the marginal
contribution of S when joining a coalition picked at random from among the 2n−s outer
coalitions :
Iv(S) =
1
2n−s
X
T NnS
[v(T [ S)− v(T )]; S N: (9)
Such an expression is in accordance with the idea of an inuence. The inuence of
any coalition S on v should not be solely determined by the number v(S), but also by
all v(S [ T ) such that T N n S. Indeed, the worth v(S) may be very low, suggesting
that S has a rather weak importance, while v(S [ T ) may be much greater than v(S)
for many coalitions T N n S, suggesting that S actually has an important inuence.
We also note that the inuence function Iv coincides on singletons with the Banzhaf
power index [1,5] :
Iv(i) = Bv(i) =
1
2n−1
X
T Nni
[v(T [ i)− v(T )]; i 2 N:
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We thus see that the inuence function is a generalization of the Banzhaf power
index. Indeed, it enables to express the global importance (or inuence) not only of
each player, but also of any coalition of players.
The concept of inuence presents some links with that of interaction among players,
which has been introduced axiomatically by Grabisch and Roubens [9] as extensions
of the Banzhaf and Shapley power indices :
 The Banzhaf interaction index related to v is dened by
IBv (S) :=
1
2n−s
X
T NnS
X
L S
(−1)s−lv(L [ T ); S N:
 The Shapley interaction index related to v is dened by
IShv (S) :=
X
T NnS
(n− t − s)! t!
(n− s+ 1)!
X
L S
(−1)s−lv(L [ T ); S N:
Grabisch et al. [8] proved that both Banzhaf and Shapley interaction indices, viewed
as set functions on N , are equivalent representations of v. The conversion formulas
involving the Mobius representation are given by
IBv (S) =
X
T  S

1
2
t−s
a(T ); S N; (10)
a(S) =
X
T  S

−1
2
t−s
IBv (T ); S N; (11)
IShv (S) =
X
T  S
1
t − s+ 1a(T ); S N; (12)
a(S) =
X
T  S
Bt−sIShv (T ); S N; (13)
where Bn is the nth Bernoulli number, that is the nth element of the numerical sequence
(Bn)n2N dened recursively by
B0 = 1;
nX
k=0

n+ 1
k

Bk = 0; n 2 N n f0g:
Since the inuence function Iv has clearly a Banzhaf-like form, it would be interesting
to express it in terms of the Banzhaf interaction index. The following proposition gives
the conversion formula. Note that one can easily show that Iv is not an equivalent
representation of v, that is, there is no conversion formula from Iv to v. In particular,
no conversion formula from Iv to IBv can be found.
J.-L. Marichal / Discrete Applied Mathematics 107 (2000) 139{164 151
Proposition 4.1. For any monotone normalized game v on N; we have
Iv(S) =
X
T  S
t odd

1
2
t−1
IBv (T ); S N:
Proof. Combining Eq. (11) with Proposition 2.4 provides, for a given S N ,
Iv(S) =
X
T N
T\S 6=;

1
2
jTnSj X
K  T

−1
2
k−t
IBv (K)
=
X
K N
K\S 6=;
X
T K
T\S 6=;

1
2
jTnSj
−1
2
k−t
IBv (K):
Partitioning T K into T1 S \ K and T2K n S, we have
Iv(S) =
X
K N
K\S 6=;

−1
2
k
IBv (K)
X
T1 S\K
T1 6=;
(−2)t1
X
T2KnS
(−1)t2
| {z }
(1−1)jKnSj
=
X
K  S
K 6=;

−1
2
k
IBv (K)
X
T1K
T1 6=;
(−2)t1
| {z }
(−1)k−1
=
X
K  S
k odd

−1
2
k−1
IBv (K);
which proves the result.
In Example 2.1, we can observe that Iv is an additive set function. Of course, this
is not the case in general. The question then arises of determining conditions on v that
assure additivity of Iv. It is easy to see that Iv is additive whenever v is of order 62,
that is such that a(S)=0 for all S N , with s>3. Rather interestingly, one can readily
see by (10) and (11) that v is of order 62 if and only if IBv (S)=0 for all S N , with
s>3. However, this condition is not necessary for Iv to be additive, as the following
result shows.
Proposition 4.2. Let v be a monotone normalized game on N . Then Iv is additive if
and only if IBv (S) = 0 for all S N such that s is odd and >3.
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Proof. The set function Iv is additive if and only if
Iv(S) =
X
i2S
Iv(i); S N; S 6= ;:
Since Iv(i)=Bv(i)= IBv (i) for all i 2 N , by Proposition 4.1, this condition is equivalent
to X
T  S
t odd;>3

1
2
t−1
IBv (T ) = 0; S N; S 6= ;: (14)
Now, for any S N , with s=3, the identity in (14) leads to IBv (S)=0. Going on with
s= 5; 7; 9; : : : ; we obtain
IBv (S) = 0 for all S N with s odd and >3:
Conversely, this latter condition implies trivially (14).
Example 4.1. Let v be the monotone normalized game on N = f1; 2; 3; 4g dened by
a(i)=1=2, a(ij)=0, a(ijk)=−1=2 for all i; j; k 2 N , and a(N )=1. It is easily veried
that Iv(S) = s=4 and hence Iv is additive.
Before closing this section, we point out an interesting link between the inuence
of players and the Banzhaf power index. We also present a recursive formula that
characterizes the inuence on monotone simple games from the Banzhaf power index.
Let v be any monotone normalized game on N . The reduced game with respect to a
coalition S N [15] is a game denoted v[S] dened on the set (N nS)[ [S] of n− s+1
players, where [S] indicates a single hypothetical player, which is the representative of
the players in S. This game is dened by
v[S](T ) =
(
v(T ) if [S] 62 T;
v(T [ S) if [S] 2 T:
Now, it is easily veried that the inuence of the coalition S on v is nothing but
the Banzhaf power index of the representative [S] in the reduced game v[S] :
Iv(S) = Iv[S] ([S]) = Bv[S] ([S]); S N: (15)
Indeed, by (9), we have
Bv[S] ([S]) =
1
2n−s
X
T NnS
[v[S](T [ [S])− v[S](T )]
=
1
2n−s
X
T NnS
[v(T [ S)− v(T )];
which is sucient.
Let v be any monotone simple game on N , that is a monotone game such that v(S) 2
f0; 1g for all S N . Given T N , we denote by v−T the game on NnT dened by
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v−T (S) = v(S) for all S NnT . This is equivalent to consider only coalitions in NnT .
We also denote by v[T the game on NnT dened by
v[T (S) = v(S [ T )− v(T ); S NnT:
This game consists in considering only coalitions containing T . Subtraction of v(T ) is
introduced simply to satisfy the condition v[T (;) = 0.
Proposition 4.3. For any monotone simple game v on N; the inuence function Iv
obeys the following recurrence formula :
Iv(S [ i) = Iv−i(S) + Iv[S (i) 8i 2 N 8S Nni: (16)
Proof. By (9), we have
Iv−i(S) =
1
2n−s−1
X
T Nn(S[i)
[v(T [ S)− v(T )];
Iv[S (i) =
1
2n−s−1
X
T Nn(S[i)
[v(T [ S [ i)− v(T [ S)]
and
Iv(S [ i) = 12n−s−1
X
T Nn(S[i)
[v(T [ S [ i)− v(T )];
which proves the result.
The recursive formula (16) has an interesting interpretation. It says that the inuence
of the union S [ i on the simple game v is equal to the inuence of S in the absence
of i plus the inuence of i in the presence of S. A symmetric version of this formula
is written
Iv(S [ i) = Iv[i(S) + Iv−S (i) 8i 2 N 8S Nni:
Notice that when v is a non-simple game, the games v−i and v[S are not necessarily
normalized and the recursive formula (16) does not hold in general. However, it always
holds when v is simple, even if v−i and v[S are identically zero.
We also observe that Eq. (16) characterizes uniquely the inuence function from its
values on singletons, namely the Banzhaf power index. A similar characterization was
proposed by Grabisch and Roubens [9] for the concept of interaction, namely
IBv (S [ i) = IBv[i(S)− IBv−i(S) 8i 2 N 8S Nni:
Both concepts of inuence and interaction can be combined in an interesting way.
For any monotone simple game v on N and any pair of players i; j 2 N , we have
Iv(ij) = Iv−j (i) + Iv−i(j) + I
B
v (ij):
Thus, the inuence of the pair fi; jg is the inuence of i in the absence of j, plus the
inuence of j in the absence of i, plus the interaction (positive or negative) between
i and j.
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The previous formula can be extended to any coalition of players. For any monotone
simple game v on N and any S N , we have (combine (15) and Recursive axiom 1
in [9]) :
Iv(S) =
X
T S
IBv−T (SnT ):
5. Robust voting schemes
Let us come back to the simple game presented in the introduction. Each player
i 2 N proposes its vote xi 2 f0; 1g, and the collective decision is given by a Boolean
function f : f0; 1gn!f0; 1g such that Pr(f = 1) = 1=2, that is,
1
2n
X
x2f0;1gn
f(x) =
1
2
:
Assume that n is odd, n= 2k − 1, and consider the majority voting scheme, whose
corresponding simple game v is dened by v(T )=1 if and only if t>k and 0 otherwise.
In that case, the inuence of any coalition S N is given by
Iv(S) =
1
2n−s
X
T NnS
[v(T [ S)− v(T )]
=
1
2n−s
X
T NnS
k−s6t6k−1
1;
that is,
Iv(S) =
1
22k−s−1
k−1+min(k−s;0)X
t=max(k−s;0)

2k − s− 1
t

=
8>><
>>:
1 if s>k;
1
22k−s−1
sX
t=1

2k − s− 1
k − t

if s<k:
In particular, the inuence of single players in the majority voting is written
Iv(i) =
1
22k−2

2k − 2
k − 1

; i 2 N:
that is, Iv(i) = O(1=
p
n) for all i 2 N .
Ben-Or and Linial [2] proposed another voting scheme that reduces the inuence of
single players to O(log n=n), which is much smaller than O(1=
p
n). The corresponding
simple game v is constructed as follows. Partition N into subsets S1; : : : ; S‘ of size
log n− log log n + c (c is an appropriate constant) and dene v(T ) = 1 if and only if
T contains Sj for some j.
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It has been proved that this voting scheme is asymptotically optimal. More precisely,
Kahn et al. [11] proved the following result.
Theorem 5.1. There exists an absolute constant C so that for every function f :
f0; 1gn!f0; 1g with Pr(f = 1) = p61=2; there is at least one j 2 N such that
If(j)>Cp
log n
n
:
Now, as the inuence function Iv is not additive in general, it might happen that the
single players have a very small inuence while some medium-sized coalitions have a
very large inuence. Back to the majority voting procedure, we have Iv(S) = 1 for all
S N such that s>k. Indeed, all these coalitions, being in the majority, are decisive.
In that case, half of the coalitions have inuence equal to one.
Therefore, a proper denition of the robustness of voting schemes should take into
consideration the inuence of all coalitions of players. The following result [3,11]
shows that we can conne ourselves to monotone games.
Proposition 5.1. Given a function f : f0; 1gn!f0; 1g; there is a monotone function
g : f0; 1gn!f0; 1g such that Pr(f = 1) = Pr(g= 1) and
If(S)>Ig(S); S N:
In order to avoid as much as possible coalitions that have a large inuence, we
could search for monotone simple games whose inuence function increases from 0
to 1 as uniformly as possible. However, there are several ways of dening such a
\uniformity". For example, one might search for games that minimize the objective
function
M (v) = max
i2N
max
T Nni
[Iv(T [ i)− Iv(T )]:
We propose here another objective function, based on the concept of entropy of a
non-additive measure. Let w be a non-additive measure on N , that is a monotone set
function w : 2N !R such that w(;)=0 and w(N )=1. When w is additive (probability
measure), it is dened solely from the values w(i) (i 2 N ) whose evenness can be
measured by means of the so-called Shannon entropy of w, that is,
H (w) =−
X
i2N
w(i) logn w(i)
with the convention that 0 logn 0 :=0.
For non-additive measures, an entropy-like measure of uniformity has been proposed
recently by the author [12, Section 6:2:4] in the framework of aggregation. Its expres-
sion, derived from the Shapley power index, is written
H (w) =−
X
i2N
X
T Nni
(n− t − 1)!t!
n!
[w(T [ i)− w(T )] logn[w(T [ i)− w(T )]:
156 J.-L. Marichal / Discrete Applied Mathematics 107 (2000) 139{164
Such an index measures somehow the regularity of the monotonicity of w from 0
to 1. The more regular the monotonicity of w, the higher its entropy H (w). Some
properties of H (w) are shown in [12,14]. For example, H (w) is maximum (=1) only
when w(S) = s=n for all S N , and minimum (=0) only when w(S) 2 f0; 1g for all
S N .
Given a monotone simple game v on N , its inuence function is clearly a non-additive
measure and the regularity of its monotonicity can be measured by H (Iv). Thus, search-
ing for robust voting schemes amounts to solving the following convex programming
problem in Boolean variables :
maximize H (Iv)
subject to
1
2n
X
T N
v(T ) =
1
2
;
v(T [ i)− v(T )>0 8i 2 N 8T Nni;
v(;) = 0; v(N ) = 1;
v(T ) 2 f0; 1g 8T N:
This problem has been solved for n65 by an exhaustive enumeration. The solutions
are the following :
 Case n = 2 : There are two optimal solutions (uninteresting), which are the two
dictatorial voting schemes. H (Iv) = 0.
 Case n = 3 : There is only one optimal solution, which is the majority voting.
H (Iv) = log3 2  0:63.
 Case n = 4 : There are 12 symmetric optimal solutions, which can be built as
follows :
1. If s>3 then v(S) = 1.
2. If s61 then v(S) = 0.
3. Take a; b; c; d 2 N and set v(S)=0 whenever s=2, except v(ab)=v(cd)=v(ac)=1
(12 possible choices).
The optimal value is H (Iv) = 17=24  0:71.
 Case n = 5 : There are 30 symmetric optimal solutions, which can be built as
follows :
1. If s>4 then v(S) = 1.
2. If s61 then v(S) = 0.
3. For s=2 and 3, v is constructed like this : Choose a; b; c; d 2 N , and set v(S)=0
whenever s=2, except v(ab)=v(cd)=1 (15 possible choices). Then, set v(S)=1
whenever s= 3, except v(ace) = v(bde) = 0, where e is the remaining element
in N (2 possible choices).
The optimal value is H (Iv) = (155 log5 2 − 36 log5 3)=60  0:70. Notice that the
majority voting is not optimal (H (Iv)  0:67).
It is worth mentioning that the optimal solutions for n=4 and 5 do not privilege any
coalition. These are symmetric solutions. One can cover all of them by rst permuting
the players at random, and then applying one of the solutions.
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Note also that depending upon what is expected from the game v, other constraints
can be added to the optimization problem. For example, I 0v = I
1
v .
We now introduce yet another objective function. Let us consider the lattice L(N )
related to the power set of N . We can represent L(N ) as a graph called the Hasse
Diagram H (N ), whose nodes correspond to the coalitions S N and the edges represent
adding a player to the bottom coalition to get the top coalition. A maximal chain of
H (N ) is an ordered collection of n+ 1 nested and distinct coalitions, that is
M= (;=M0  M1     Mn−1  Mn = N ):
It is then natural to search for games v on N that minimize
Z(v) = max
M2C(N )
1
n
nX
i=0
Iv(Mi);
where C(N ) denotes the set of maximal chains of H (N ). Since, for each maximal
chain M there exists a unique permutation  on N such that Mi = f(1); : : : ; (i)g for
all i 2 N , this objective function can be written
Z(v) = max
2(N )
1
n
nX
i=1
Iv((1); : : : ; (i));
where (N ) is the set of permutations on N .
For the dictatorial voting, we obtain the maximum value : Z(v)=1. For the majority
voting, we obtain
Z(v) =
1
2k − 1
"
k−1X
s=1
1
22k−s−1
sX
t=1

2k − s− 1
k − t

+ k
#
; (17)
that is, Z(v)=0:83; 0:82; 0:83; 0:84; 0:95; 0:96 for k=2; 3; 4; 5; 100; 200, respectively. An
exhaustive search showed that value (17) is optimal for k = 2 and 3.
We thus observe that more than one objective function can be considered. However,
we must be very cautious when choosing the objective function. For example, the
average value of Iv over all the coalitions, that is
1
2n
X
T N
Iv(T ) or
X
T N
(n− t)!t!
(n+ 1)!
Iv(T )
is not an appropriate function to minimize. It is smaller for the dictatorial voting than
for the majority voting.
We can also observe that, under the condition Pr(f=1)=1=2, there will always be
small dominant coalitions. This is actually a result established in [3,11] :
Theorem 5.2. For every j> 0; there exists a constant C(j) so that for every function
f : f0; 1gn!f0; 1g with Pr(f=1)=1=2; there is S N; with s=C(j)n=log n so that
If(S)>1− j:
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6. Inuence of criteria in multicriteria decision-making problems
As mentioned in the introduction, the so-called discrete Choquet integral can be used
to aggregate criteria in many multicriteria decision-making problems. In this section,
we investigate the inuence function associated to this aggregation operator.
The concept of Choquet integral has been rst introduced in capacity theory [4].
Its use as an aggregation operator in decision-making has been proposed by several
authors (see [7] and the references therein). Moreover, an axiomatic characterization
was proposed by the author in [12,13].
Recall that a non-additive measure on N is a monotone set function v : 2N ! [0; 1]
such that v(;) = 0 and v(N ) = 1. For any combination S N of criteria, v(S) is then
interpreted as the weight or the degree of importance of S.
Denition 6.1. Let v be a non-additive measure on N . The Choquet integral of x 2
[0; 1]n with respect to v is dened by
Cv(x) :=
nX
i=1
x(i)[v(A(i))− v(A(i+1))];
where () indicates a permutation on N such that x(1)6   6x(n). Also A(i)=f(i); : : : ; (n)g,
and A(n+1) = ;.
For instance, if x36x16x2, we have
Cv(x1; x2; x3) = x3[v(3; 1; 2)− v(1; 2)] + x1[v(1; 2)− v(2)] + x2v(2):
The Choquet integral is closely related to the Lebesgue integral (weighted arithmetic
mean), since both coincide when the measure v is additive :
Cv(x) =
nX
i=1
v(i)xi; x 2 [0; 1]n:
It was proved [12,13] that the Choquet integral Cv is nothing but the Lovasz exten-
sion of the PBF which represents v. By Propositions 3.2 and 3.3, we then have
ICv(S) =
X
T NnS
(n− t − s)!t!
(n− s+ 1)! [v(T [ S)− v(T )]; (18)
ICv(S) =
X
T N
T\S 6=;
a(T )
1
jTnSj+ 1 (19)
for all S N . It follows that this inuence function ICv coincides on singletons with
the Shapley power index [18] :
ICv(i) = Shv(i) =
X
T Nni
(n− t − 1)!t!
n!
[v(T [ i)− v(T )]; i 2 N:
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We now calculate the inuence function with respect to two particular Choquet
integrals, namely the weighted arithmetic mean and the ordered weighted averaging.
Any vector ! 2 [0; 1]n such that Pi !i = 1 will be called a weight vector as we
continue.
6.1. The weighted arithmetic mean
Denition 6.2. For any weight vector ! 2 [0; 1]n; the weighted arithmetic mean oper-
ator WAM! associated to ! is dened by
WAM!(x) =
nX
i=1
!i xi:
We have seen that WAM! is a Choquet integral Cv with respect to an additive
measure :
v(S) =
X
i2S
!i; S N:
Moreover, it is clear that the inuence of S N over WAM! is given by the sum of
the weights related to S :
IWAM!(S) =
X
i2S
!i; S N:
6.2. The ordered weighted averaging
Yager [19] has dened in 1988 the ordered weighted averaging operators (OWA)
as follows.
Denition 6.3. For any weight vector ! 2 [0; 1]n; the ordered weighted averaging
operator OWA! associated to ! is dened by
OWA!(x) =
nX
i=1
!i x(i)
with the convention that x(1)6   6x(n).
The following result, due to Grabisch [6], shows that any OWA operator is a Choquet
integral with respect to a non-additive measure that depends only on the cardinality of
subsets, also called cardinality-based non-additive measure.
Proposition 6.1. Let v be a non-additive measure on N . Then the following assertions
are equivalent :
(i) For any S; S 0N such that jSj= jS 0j; we have v(S) = v(S 0).
(ii) There exists a weight vector ! 2 [0; 1]n such that Cv =OWA!.
(iii) Cv is a symmetric function.
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The non-additive measure v associated to OWA! is given by
v(S) =
nX
i=n−s+1
!i; S N; S 6= ;: (20)
Finally, the following proposition gives the inuence function associated to an OWA
operator.
Proposition 6.2. For any weight vector ! 2 [0; 1]n; we have
IOWA!(S) =
1
n− s+ 1
nX
i=1
!imin(i; s; n− i + 1; n− s+ 1); S N:
Proof. Fix k 2 N and consider the operator OWA! dened by !i = 1 i i= k, and 0
otherwise. This operator is actually the kth order statistic
OSk(x) = x(k); x 2 [0; 1]n:
By Proposition 6.1, we can set vt : =v(T ) for all T N . Fixing S N , we have, by
(18),
IOSk (S) =
1
n− s+ 1
X
T NnS
1
n− s
t
 (vt+s − vt)
=
1
n− s+ 1
n−sX
t=0
(vt+s − vt):
By (20), we have
vt =

1 if t>n− k + 1;
0 otherwise
and hence,
vt+s − vt =

1 if n− k − s+ 16t6n− k;
0 otherwise:
We then have
IOSk (S) =
1
n− s+ 1
min(n−k;n−s)X
t=max(0; n−k−s+1)
1
and two cases can be considered :
 If k6s then
IOSk (S) =
(n− s+ 1)−max(0; n− k − s+ 1)
n− s+ 1 =
min(n− s+ 1; k)
n− s+ 1 :
 If k>s then
IOSk (S) =
(n− k + 1)−max(0; n− k − s+ 1)
n− s+ 1 =
min(n− k + 1; s)
n− s+ 1 :
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Summing up, we obtain
IOSk (S) =
min(k; s; n− k + 1; n− s+ 1)
n− s+ 1 :
Finally, for any weight vector ! 2 [0; 1]n, we have
OWA! =
nX
i=1
!i OSi
and the result follows from the linearity of the inuence with respect to the non-additive
measure.
In particular, for min = OS1 and max = OSn, we have
Imin(S) = Imax(S) =
1
n− s+ 1 ; S N:
For the median function (median = OSk , with n= 2k − 1), we have, for any S N ,
Imedian(S) =
min(k; s; 2k − s)
2k − s
=

1 if s>k;
s
2k−s if s<k:
Notice that the underlying non-additive measure of the median function corresponds to
the majority voting scheme.
7. An alternative denition of inuence on PBFs
In this nal section, we show that, for any monotone normalized PBF f, the inuence
function If^ can also be viewed as an inuence function associated to f and dened
from a specic probability distribution.
We have seen in Section 2 that, for any monotone normalized function f : f0; 1gn!R,
we have
If(S) = E[f( ~1Sy−S)− f( ~0Sy−S)]; S N;
where the expectation if dened from the uniform distribution. However, the uniform
distribution does not take into account the fact that there are elements inside each
subset, and that a single element is involved several times in dierent subsets, especially
with subsets of around n=2 elements, which are the most numerous. This means that
a distribution taking into account this combinatorial aspect should be used to avoid
this eect. For instance, consider f0; 1gN as a probability space with the following
distribution :
p(y) :=
1
n+ 1

nP
i yi
−1
; y 2 f0; 1gN : (21)
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This is a well-dened distribution since p(y)>0 for any y 2 f0; 1gN , and
X
y2f0;1gN
p(y) =
1
n+ 1
X
T N

n
t
−1
=
1
n+ 1
nX
t=0
1
n
t
 X
T N
jT j=t
1 = 1:
Moreover, with this distribution, the expectation of any function is calculated rst over
the subsets of the same size t 2 f0; : : : ; ng and then over all the possible sizes.
Now, for any monotone normalized function f : f0; 1gn!R, we have, by Eq. (7),
If^(S) =
1
n− s+ 1
X
T NnS

n− s
t
−1
[f(eT[S)− f(eT )]; S N;
or equivalently,
If^(S) =
1
n− s+ 1
X
y2f0;1gNnS

n− sP
iyi
−1
[f( ~1Sy−S)− f( ~0Sy−S)]; S N:
Therefore, we have
If^(S) = E[f( ~1Sy−S)− f( ~0Sy−S)]; S N;
where the expectation if dened from distribution (21). Actually, this expectation can
be taken over all y 2 [0; 1]N , as the following result shows.
Proposition 7.1. For any monotone normalized function f : f0; 1gn!R; we have
If^(S) =
1
n+ 1
X
y2f0;1gN

nP
iyi
−1
[f( ~1Sy−S)− f( ~0Sy−S)]; S N:
Proof. For any S N , we have
1
n+ 1
X
y2f0;1gN

nP
iyi
−1
[f( ~1Sy−S)− f( ~0Sy−S)]
=
1
n+ 1
X
T N
T\S 6=;
a(T )
X
y2f0;1gN

nP
iyi
−1 Y
i2TnS
yi
=
1
n+ 1
X
T N
T\S 6=;
a(T )
X
K N

n
k
−1 Y
i2TnS
(eK)i
=
1
n+ 1
X
T N
T\S 6=;
a(T )
X
K  TnS

n
k
−1
:
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Moreover, for any T N , we have
X
K  TnS

n
k
−1
=
nX
k=jTnSj

n− jTnSj
k − jTnSj

n
k
−1
=

n
jTnSj
−1 nX
k=jTnSj

k
jTnSj

=
n+ 1
jTnSj+ 1 :
We then conclude by Proposition 3.2.
Consequently, when we reason on elements rather than subsets, it seems that the
inuence function on f should be given by If^ instead of If. A similar analysis has
been done for Banzhaf and Shapley interaction indices, see [8, Section 2].
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